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Topic No. 12: Dual Class Shares 
Part 1: German Law  by: Gabriel Walter 
“More equal than others.”  George Orwell’s famous quote from “Animal Farm” also 
perfectly questions and criticises the dual class share system. 
 Introduction 
It is easy to assume that all shares represent an equal percentage of a corporation, 
granting the same rights and duties to their shareholders.  This consideration of a share-system 
is far wrong.  Nowadays in a system of market economy and global financial policy 
corporations create financial products like “Contingent Convertible Bonds” (CoCo-Bonds), 
registered shares with restricted transferability (vinkulierte Namensaktien) and dual class share 
systems. 
But this does not indicate that the “simple” “one-share, one-vote” system is outdated.  
This paper questions the importance and influence of dual class shares as a competitor to “one-
share, one-vote” and how the structure impacts governmental regulation. Do dual class shares 
need to be state regulated or is the market able to regulate itself? 
The paper starts with the presentation of the dual class share system.  Therefore we will 
show the various possible structures of dual class shares in detail.  After the introduction into 
the topic of dual class shares we will take a closer look to the origin of dual class shares in 
Germany and the historical development up to the current legal situation.  Then different 
sections of the AktG (Aktiengesetz), enabling the creation of dual class shares and their 
restriction, are going to be constituted.  Finally we end with a comparison of the pros and cons 
of dual class shares and “one-share, one-vote”. 
 Dual Class Shares 
What are dual class shares?  To make dual class share system more understandable, a 
brief overview how shares were “traditionally” held in corporations, follows. 
  “One-share, one-vote” 
Does a company have an intention to go public?  The most common reason for an initial 
public offering (IPO) is to raise equity, to create a proper foundation for a future expansion of 
the company and to raise a potentially global awareness.1 
Once a private company decides to make their IPO, it comes to the sale of corporation 
shares to the public.2  The shares are offered on a stock exchange, in Germany for example the 
                                                 
1 Deutsche Börse AG, Praxishandbuch Börsengang, P. 23. 
2 Steve, IPO Risk Management: Risks of an Initial Public Offering, P. 5. 
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Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX).  These shares give the shareholder a proportional right to the 
corporation.  These rights entitle the shareholder firstly to take part and vote in general 
corporation meetings, and secondly to participate at dividend payouts.3  In a “one share-one” 
vote system, the shareholder has for each share he owns one vote.4  And the amount of his 
dividend payout correlates to the percentage of shares he owns of the corporation.5 
The intention behind the “one-share, one-vote” system is to create a balance between 
equity power and voting power.  A shareholder holding most of the shares and therefore also 
most of the corporations equity should have most of the power when it comes to general 
decisions.  In the “one-share, one-vote” system the shareholders can be considered owners of 
the corporation.  Although they own the corporation they are normally not the ones running it.  
This is the manager’s duty.  The shareholders however, have the right to monitor the 
management and if it does not run the corporation to the best of the shareholders’ interests, the 
shareholders can overrule the management’s decision.6  This way “one-share, one-vote” 
guarantees that decisions in the corporation are made on behalf of the shareholders’ interests. 
 Class A and Class B shares – and their different Types 
In a dual class share system the power of equity and the voting power can be separated.  
Corporations separating voting- and equity power do have two different classes of shares, and 
are therefore “dual class shares.”  The first class of shares, the class A shares – in Germany they 
are called common shares (Stammaktien) – have one vote per share.7  The second type, the class 
B shares – in Germany they are called preference shares (Vorzugsaktien) – have no voting 
power.8 
a) Dividend preference 
The first question coming into mind is: “Why should someone buy a share without 
voting power?”  There would be no cause for a reasonable investor to buy class B shares if he 
could also buy class A shares.  Therefore class B shares offer an advantage over class A shares; 
they have a dividend preference.9  Within this dividend preference there are four different types 
of preferences; the “dividend privilege” (Dividendenbevorrechtigung), the “off-dividend” 
                                                 
3 finanzen.net GmbH, Rechte und Pflichten als Aktionär. 
4 Henn/Frodermann/Jannott, Handbuch des Aktienrechts, recital 229. 
5 Id. at recital 285. 
6 Frey/Osterloh, Successful management by motivation, P. 102. 
7 Henn/Frodermann/Jannott, Handbuch des Aktienrechts, recital 229. 
8 Lange, in: Hennsler/Arnold § 12, recital 5. 
9 Doerks, Der Kursunterschied zwischen Stamm- und Vorzugsaktien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, P. 7 f. 
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(Überdividende), the “highest dividend” (Höchstdividende) and the “cumulative dividend” 
(kumulative Dividende).10 
  In the case of a “dividend privilege” the class B shareholders get a dedicated part of 
dividend payment in advance which is fixed in the corporations statute; if there is more profit 
to be distributed, the class A shareholders get paid the same dividend as the class B shareholders 
and a remaining amount will be paid proportionally to the value of the shares.11  
In the case of the “of-dividend” class B shareholders have the same fixed price 
preference as with the “dividend privilege” for one exception that they must get a fix bonus 
unlike the class A shareholders.12  So with the “of-dividend” the class B shareholders receive a 
higher dividend distribution regardless of the distributed amount of money. 
The “highest dividend” type allows a statutory set upper limit for class B shares.13  That 
means, class B shares have a preference compared to class A shares up to a certain amount.  
After this amount has been paid, class B shares will be completely ignored in the dividend 
distribution. 
“Cumulative dividend” is an additional rule that can but does not have to be used on 
“dividend privilege” or “of-dividend.”14  This means that if the preference distribution of class 
B shares has been absent in previous years it must be paid in full later.15 
So class B shares can be a good stock type for investors, who only want to invest their 
money to make profit and have no interest in ruling the corporation.  In a case like Volkswagen 
for example it makes no sense for a small investor to buy class A shares, because he would need 
to invest at least a couple of million euros to buy enough class A shares to create actual voting 
power. 
b) Hostile takeover protection 
The higher dividend distribution is an incentive for an investor buying class B shares.  
But why should a company create two different classes of shares and then only sell preference 
shares to the public?  In the following the different issues that make dual class shares attractive 
to companies are going to be constituted. 
One reason for a dual class share system is protection against hostile takeovers.16  If a 
corporation has their entire firm value as common shares on the open market, competitors could 
                                                 
10 Id. at 8. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 9. 
15 Id. 
16 Partch, Journal of Financial Economics 1987, 313, P. 316 f. 
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buy enough shares to obtain the 75% obstacle to achieve the absolute majority necessary for 
fundamental changes.17  The absolute majority is for instance is needed to wind up the 
corporation (§ 262 I No. 2 AktG18) or to change the corporations statute (§ 179 II AktG19).  
Therefore dual class shares offer a corporation the opportunity to raise capital by only selling 
class B shares and keep the voting power by retaining the class A stock to make a potential 
hostile takeover impossible. 
c) Preservation of power 
Another way dual class shares are used is to keep the power over the company within a 
small exclusive circle after going public.20 
Family owners 
If for instance family owned companies go public and want the power to remain within 
the family they offer class B shares without voting power at their IPO.21  A current German 
example for such power preservation is the IPO of Schaeffler AG in October 2015.  The 
Company’s shareholders are Maria-Elisabeth Schaeffler-Thumann and her son Georg F. W. 
Schaeffler together holding the entire voting power.22  On October 8, 2015 the Schaeffler AG 
went public at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and placed 75 million preference shares that 
contributed a capital of 938 million Euros.23  These 75 million preference shares represent about 
11% of the corporation’s total value but 0% of the voting power.24  Schaeffler’s decision to sell 
a part of the corporation was inter alia to reduce their depts.25  One can see that the Schaeffler 
AG wanted to raise capital but did not want to give power to a non-family member. 
d) Heavy weight leader 
But also founders having plans and visions about how their company should develop, 
often do not want to give away the power.  The most famous example is Mark Zuckerberg who 
uses dual class shares as one way to retain the power over Facebook so that investors with short 
term interests cannot put pressure on him if he is making long term decisions.26 
                                                 
17 Schneider/Heidenhain, The German Stock Corporation Act, P. 14. 
18 Gesetz zur Reform des Verfahrens in Familiensachen und in den Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen 
Gerichtsbarkeit (FGG-Reformgesetz) in the version of December 17th, 2008, BGBl I, 2008, 2586 (2732). 
19 Aktiengesetz (AktG), in the version of September 6th, 1965, BGBl I, 1965, 1089 (1135). 
20 Andenæs/Wooldridge, European comparative company law, P. 190. 
21 Culpepper, Quiet politics and business power, P. 42. 
22 Schaeffler Gruppe | Konzern | Gesellschafter. 
23 Schaeffler Gruppe | Pressewelt | Pressemitteilungen | Schaeffler schließt Börsengang ab. 
24 Schaeffler Gruppe | Pressewelt | Pressemitteilungen | Schaeffler startet Aktienplatzierung. 
25 Schaeffler Gruppe | Pressewelt | Pressemitteilungen | Schaeffler geht an die Börse. 
26 Here's how Mark Zuckerberg keeps Facebook's investors in check. 
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e) Preservation of governmental interests 
A third way the dual class share system is, or better had been used in Europe, to preserve 
governmental interests.27  Governments created so-called “golden shares,”28 The most famous 
example for a golden share in Germany is Volkswagen AG.29  
Few corporations in Germany are state-owned, respectively used to be state-owned 
companies. Back in 1960 the VWGmbHÜG was passed.  Section 1 Sec. 1 VWGmbHÜG30 
directed to convert Volkswagen GmbH into Volkswagen AG. § 2 sec. 1 VWGmbHÜG31 
defined, that no shareholder may have more than 20 percent of the entire voting power even 
owning more shares.  Moreover, § 4 sec. 1 VWGmbHÜG32 gave the Federal Republic and the 
State Niedersachsen the right to delegate two members to the supervisory board.  This gave the 
State Niedersachsen who holds around 20 percent of Volkswagen AG shares33 a 
disproportionate influence on the corporation’s policy. 
But these rights do not exist anymore.  In 2007 the ECJ declared the VWGmbHÜG 
violating European law.34 
 Historical background 
In 1844 preference shares without voting power appeared on the German market for the 
first time.35  Shareholder of a railway company that held such preference shares received an 
advanced dividend of 4 percent of their share value.36  After that, preference shares did not gain 
much popularity and were only existing in railway companies until the late fifties when other 
economic sectors became aware of it.37  At that time there was no law about common shares 
and preference shares whether a class of shares had voting power or not was set in the 
partnership agreement.38  This arbitrariness changed in 1884 when the “Aktienrechtsnovelle” 
(corporation law amendment) determined that every share has the same voting power.39 
                                                 
27 Winkler, Das Stimmrecht der Aktionäre in der Europäischen Union, P. 14. 
28 Id. at 14 f. 
29 Dr. Frank Jungfleisch, Dr. Jan Henning Martens, Starke Minderheitsgesellschafter und „Goldene Aktien“ | 
Recht | Haufe. 
30 Gesetz über die Überführung der Anteilsrechte an der Volkswagenwerk Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung 
in private Hand (VWGmbHÜG), in the version of July 27th, 1960, BGBl I, 1960, 585 (585). 
31 Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes über die Überführung der Anteilsrechte an der Volkswagenwerk 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in private Hand (VWGmbHÜG), in the version of July 31st, 1970, BGBl 
I, 1970, 1149 (1149). 
32 Gesetz über die Überführung der Anteilsrechte an der Volkswagenwerk Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung 
in private Hand (VWGmbHÜG), in the version of July 27th, 1960, BGBl I, 1960, 585 (586). 
33 Volkswagen Konzern Aktionärsstruktur. 
34 SPIEGEL ONLINE, Urteil: Europäischer Gerichtshof kippt VW-Gesetz. 
35 Bezzenberger, Vorzugsaktien ohne Stimmrecht, P. 6. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 According to Article 224 II, 190 ADHGB of 1869.   
39 Bezzenberger, Vorzugsaktien ohne Stimmrecht, P. 7. 
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With the implementation of the HGB (commercial code) in 1887 corporations got the 
opportunity to create shares with multiple-voting rights.40  Interestingly most people considered 
multiple-voting rights as bad and so they did not gain much popularity in Germany until after 
First World War when shares with more than twenty votes per share came up.41  Corporation 
owners used the dual class share system to protect their corporation against foreign infiltration 
from both, abroad and inland.42  The advantage of this corporation financing, other than with 
credits, meant a corporation only had to pay the shareholders if it made profit.43  The number 
of corporations that held shares with multiple-voting rights varied particularly in that time.  It 
first increased rapidly, so that in 1925 more than half of the 1600 listed corporations in Germany 
held such shares and decreased from then on to only a third of all listed corporations.44 
The first time preference shares without voting power were legally regulated was in the 
AktG of 1937.45  Sections 115 – 117 AktG46 determined that preference shares without voting 
power could only be issued if the shareholders have a preference at the dividend payments.  
1965 those sections were mostly assumed to the new AktG.47  One important change was that 
a corporation could now have 50 percent of its value as preference shares without voting 
power.48  But preference shares did not gain any popularity.  In 1963 only 20 of all listed 
corporations in Germany had preference shares49 and until the 1980s this number did not change 
much.50 
That time hostile takeovers increased in Germany51 and corporations found out that 
inventing a second class of shares without voting power and selling only these to the public 
would be an effective way of self-protection against hostile takeovers.52  So the number of 
corporations with a dual class share system increased again, reached its peak in the 1990s and 
is decreasing since then.53  At its peak 28 of the DAX-100 listed corporations had preference 
shares.54 
                                                 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 8. 
42 Gerster, Stimmrechtsaktien, P. 17 f. 
43 Feddersen, in: Habersack, Festschrift für Peter Ulmer zum 70. Geburtstag am 2. Januar 2003, P. 107. 
44 Bezzenberger, Vorzugsaktien ohne Stimmrecht, P. 8. 
45 Kriebel, in: Die Aktiengesellschaft 1963, 175 (175). 
46 Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften und Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien (Aktiengesetz), in the version of 
January 30th, 1937, RGBl I, 1937 107. 
47 Aktiengesetz, in the version of September 6th, 1965, BGBl, 1965, 1089. 
48 Feddersen, in: Habersack, Festschrift für Peter Ulmer zum 70. Geburtstag am 2. Januar 2003, P. 107. 
49 Kriebel, in: Die Aktiengesellschaft 1963, 175 (176). 
50 Feddersen, in: Habersack, Festschrift für Peter Ulmer zum 70. Geburtstag am 2. Januar 2003, P. 108. 
51 Taylor, Dueling shares: comparative EU-US corporate governance practices (2013), P. 35. 
52 Partch, Journal of Financial Economics 1987, 313, P. 316 f. 
53 Vins, Die Ausgabe konkurrierender Vorzugsaktien bei der SE, P. 36. 
54 Feddersen, in: Habersack, Festschrift für Peter Ulmer zum 70. Geburtstag am 2. Januar 2003, P. 108. 
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 Unification trend of dual class shares at the turn of the century 
In the beginning of the 21st century major listed corporations like Lufthansa, Metro, 
Puma, Sixt, RWE and SAP started to convert their preference into common shares and in 2003 
the number of the DAX-100 listed corporations with preference shares decreased to 18.55  RWE 
offered their preference shareholders to buy voting rights, and Lufthansa simply gave those 
rights for free.56 
Since June 2002 corporations can only choose one class of shares for their admission to 
the German stock indices.57  Only the chosen class of shares is considered to evaluate the 
corporation.  Thus a corporation having a dual class share system on the index is underestimated 
compared to its actual value; therefore more Companies switched the division of their shares. 
 Growing trend of dual class shares today 
In 2009, preference shares underwent a revival in Germany, spearheaded by 
Volkswagen AG and Fresenius SE.58  Both companies are listed at the DAX and placed 
preference shares on the open Market in 2009.59  In December 2009 Volkswagen replaced their 
common shares on the DAX with their preference shares.60  Qatar had bought another stock of 
Volkswagen common shares so the number of free float shares dropped below 10%; and the 
DAX directives cause an exit of a share class if the number of free float shares go under that 
limit.61 
With the amendment of the AktG in 2015 and the change of § 139 I AktG62 corporations 
got the chance to create more attractive preference shares which made the dual class share 
system even more popular.63  Before the amendment of § 139 I AktG the of-dividend was 
separated from the preference and therefore there was no obligation to pay the of-dividend back, 
if it had not been distributed in the previous year.64  With the amendment this separation has 
been taken out of the AktG.  That gives corporations the chance to put the preference (dividend 
privilege) and the of-dividend together, and if they cannot be distributed in one year, the 
                                                 
55 Id. 
56 Die WELT: „Die Vorzugsaktie als Auslaufmodell" (1998). 
57 Senger and Vogelmann, in: Die Aktiengesellschaft 2002, 193 (193). 
58 Mohr, Vorzugsaktien: Neue Blüte dank VW. 
59 Id. 
60 Baron, Oliver, VW-Vorzugsaktien kommen in den DAX. 
61 Id. 
62 Gesetz zur Änderung des Aktiengesetzes (Aktienrechtsnovelle 2016), in the version of december 22nd, 2015, 
BGBl I, 2015, 2565 (2566). 
63 Anschütz David: in Bucerius Law Journal 2015, 10 (14). 
64 Id. 
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corporation has the obligation to pay the missing of-dividend and the privilege dividend back 
in the next year.65  This should guaranty shareholders a solid investment. 
Nowadays 4 of the 30 listed corporations have issued preference shares on the DAX.66 
 Governmental regulation in Germany 
The market share of preference shares on the DAX or other indices has always been 
connected to governmental regulations, as one can see at the historical development of dual 
class shares.  In Germany the AktG is the most important law for corporations.  Consequently 
the current legal situation of the AktG is going to be presented. 
Regulations and stipulations of the AktG 
The AktG is the legal basis for the existence of a dual class share system in Germany.  
The sections that determine the corporation’s right to issue preference shares are going to be 
presented in detail in the following. 
a) § 11 AktG67 
Section 11 AktG is the basis for the existence of dual class shares.  It gives the 
opportunity to create different membership rights and entitlements two of which are mentioned 
in sentence “one.”68  Whereby the two namely mentioned examples are not concluding.69  
Section 11 AktG only defines membership rights to be distinguished from creditor rights.70  The 
difference in between these two rights are “Accessoriness”, “the prohibition of separation” and 
“the possibility to amend.”  These features define membership rights. 
“Accessoriness” means membership rights correlate with the membership.71  
Membership rights cannot be created without earning a membership.  “The prohibition of 
separation” means membership rights cannot be separated from the membership.72  Only the 
person being member can use the rights, they cannot be given or sold to someone else.  But the 
shareholder does not have to vote personally.73  The voting right can be used by a legal 
representative (§ 134 III AktG74), by a contractual representative (§ 135 AktG75) or by an 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 15. 
67 Aktiengesetz (AktG), in the version of September 6th, 1965, BGBl I, 1965, 1089 (1093). 
68 Lange, in: Henssler/Arnold § 11, recital 1. 
69 Solveen, in: Hölters § 11, recital 1. 
70 Heider, in: MüKo § 11, recital 6. 
71 Id. at recital 7. 
72 Id. at recital 8. 
73 Solveen, in: Hölters § 12, recital 5. 
74 Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Aktionärsrechterichtline (ARUG), in the version of July 30th, 2009, BGBl I, 2009, 
2479 (2483). 
75 Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Transparenzrichtline-Änderungsrichtline, in the version of December 20th, 2015, 
BGBl I, 2015 2029 (2042). 
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entitled third party on their own behalf (§ 129 III AktG76).77  “The possibility to amend” means 
membership rights can be changed if the board of the corporation decides it at a general 
meeting.78  The three features define membership rights in distinction to creditor rights. 
One could think, § 11 AktG impinges the principle of equality set in § 53a AktG.79  It 
says to treat shareholders alike under equal conditions.  But since the different classes of shares 
create different, unequal conditions only shareholders of one class have to be treated equally.  
Yet the unequal treatment may not be arbitrarily, it has to be justified in the general meeting.80 
Sentence “two” defines classes of shares.  A class are all shares with same rights.81  But 
this definition is incomplete, because shares are also of the same class if they have same 
duties.82  A new class of shares exists if there is a share with different rights or duties.83  
Therefore it does not matter if these rights or duties existed from the beginning (conversion into 
a corporation) or have been added at a later time.84 
b) § 12 AktG85 
Section 12 AktG has three important regulations.  The first sentence defines that every 
share has voting rights and that there is no voting right without a share.86  But what are voting 
rights?  Voting rights give the shareholder the opportunity to take part and vote at the general 
meeting.87  His vote has that much power as the shares he owns grant; and the right to vote 
cannot be taken away against his will.88  There is an exception as mentioned above that 
corporations which are not listed on an index can give “maximum voting rights” 
(Höchststimmrechte).89  This exception will be discussed later under § 134 AktG.  
                                                 
76 Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Aktionärsrechterichtline (ARUG), in the version of July 30th, 2009, BGBl I, 2009, 
2479 (2483). 
77 Solveen, in: Hölters § 12, recital 5. 
78 Heider, in: MüKo § 11, recital 9. 
79 Gesetz zur Durchführung der zweiten Richtlinie des Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften zur 
Koordinierung des Gesellschaftsrechts, in the version of December 13th, 1978, BGBl I, 1978, 1959 (1960); 
Solveen, in: Hölters § 11, recital 2. 
80 Solveen, in: Hölters § 11, recital 2. 
81 Lange, in: Henssler/Arnold § 11, recital 6. 
82 Solveen, in: Hölters § 11, recital 1. 
83 Id. at recital 14. 
84 Koch, in: Hüffer § 11, recital 7. 
85 Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG), in the version of april 27th, 1998, 
BGBl I, 1998, 786. 
86 Lange, in: Henssler/Arnold § 12, recital 1. 
87 Id. at recital 3. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at recital 5. 
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Sentence two defines the exception to the rule and sets that preference shares can be 
issued without voting rights.  There are other exceptions,90 but they are not pertinent for the 
topic of dual class shares and therefore they will be ignored. 
Paragraph two prohibits multiple voting rights (Mehrstimmrechte).91  Multiple voting 
rights were permitted in Germany throughout the 20th Century.92  Since May 31, 2003, 
however, German stock corporation law has established the principle of “proportionate voting 
rights,” under which every share grants one voting right, except for preference shares.93  So 
statutory provisions that allow shares with more voting power than one vote per share are 
prohibited94 and the statute is invalid if it allows multiple voting rights anyhow.95 This 
restriction also includes non-listed corporations.96 
c) § 23 AktG97 
Section 23 III No. 4 AktG defines different things.  First the statute has to clarify if the 
corporation has issued par value shares (Nennbetragsaktien) or unit shares (Stückaktien).98  If 
the corporation has issued unit shares, the exact number of issued shares needs to be included 
in the statute as well.99  If the corporation has issued par value shares the amount a share grants 
needs to be set in the statute.100  If the corporation has issued different share classes, the different 
classes have to be mentioned and the number of shares each class holds.101  This is a useful 
information for potential investors, because they can see in the statute of a corporation the 
percentage portion of each share class in comparison to the share capital, which makes the 
research prior to a potential stock purchase easier.  The issue price of the different share classes, 
which may vary in between the classes, has also to be set in the statute.102  If one of the 
requirements is missing in the statute, the corporation cannot be registered and if it is going to 
be registered anyway the registry court can initiate a legal proceeding against the corporation.103 
                                                 
90 Id. at recital 1. 
91 Id. at recital 7. 
92 Vatter, in: Spindler/Stilz § 12, recital 16. 
93 Vatter, in: Spindler/Stilz § 12, recital 26; Solveen, in: Hölters § 12, recital 11. 
94 Lange, in: Henssler/Arnold § 12, recital 7. 
95 Solveen, in: Hölters § 12, recital 13. 
96 Lange, in: Henssler/Arnold § 12, recital 9. 
97 Gesetz über die Zulassung von Stückaktien (Stückaktiengesetz), in the version of March 25th, 1998, BGBl I, 
1998, 590 (590). 
98 Solveen, in: Hölters § 23, recital 25. 
99 Koch, in: Hüffer § 23, recital 29. 
100 Pentz, in: MüKo § 23, recital 59. 
101 Limmer, in: Spindler/Stilz § 23, recital 20. 
102 Id. 
103 Pentz, in: MüKo § 23, recital 133. 
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In the German stock corporation law the freedom of contract has no meaning.104  
Paragraph 5 defines the “statute stringency” (Satzungsstrenge), which means that the statutes 
can only deviate from the legal regulation of the stock corporation act if explicitly permitted.105  
This restricts the autonomy of the statute severely, but it also protects potential shareholders 
and guaranties the marketability of stocks.106  Every shareholder can be sure that each statute 
fulfils the same requirements and has no unusual definition.107 
It is important to distinguish between deviating- and additional statutory provisions.108  
A deviating statutory provision is only allowed if it is explicitly permitted in the Stock 
Corporation Act.109  It is a deviation when the statue contains other regulations than the Stock 
Corporation Act.110  A permitted deviation for instance is the determination of other, 
respectively higher majorities at the general meeting in § 52 V AktG.111  It is an additional 
statutory provision if the law did not specify the questioned section, or the statutory provision 
only amends the law without changing the laws principle.112  Thus an additional statutory 
provision is permitted if the law does not have a final provision for the questioned section.113  
Such a permitted additional statutory provision is, as mentioned above, § 11 sent.  2 AktG which 
allows corporations to issue shares of different classes.114  If the statute of the corporation 
violates the provision of § 23 V AktG the corporation cannot be registered.115 
d) § 134 AktG 
Whereas § 12 AktG is giving shareholders the right to vote, § 134 AktG structures the 
exercise of these voting rights.116  Section 134 I sent. 1 AktG implies that the full capital 
contribution has been made and declares how the voting power of a shareholder calculates.117  
For unit shares the voting power is calculated by the percentage of shares a shareholder owns.118  
As mentioned above § 134 I sent. 2 AktG distinguishes between listed and non-listed 
                                                 
104 Vetter, in: Henssler/Arnold § 23, recital 22. 
105 Id. 
106 Limmer, in: Spindler/Stilz § 23, recital 28. 
107 Pentz, in: MüKo § 23, recital 158. 
108 Id. at recital 159. 
109 Vetter, in: Henssler/Arnold § 23, recital 23. 
110 Id. 
111 Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Aktionärsrechterichtline (ARUG) in the version of July 30th, 2009, BGBI. I, 2009, 
2479 (2480).  
112 Solveen, in: Hölters § 23, recital 31. 
113 Id. 
114 Limmer, in: Spindler/Stilz § 23, recital 30. 
115 Id. at recital 31. 
116 Koch, in: Hüffer § 134, recital 1. 
117 Liebscher, in: Henssler/Arnold § 134, recital 2. 
118 Rieckers, in: Spindler/Stilz § 134, recital 6. 
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corporations.  Non-listed corporations have the opportunity the give out “maximum voting 
rights.  
Maximum voting power means that the voting power of a shareholder cannot be higher 
than a limit, which must be set in the corporation’s statute, independently of the share capital 
he owns.119 
§ 134 II sent. 1 AktG sets that the voting power of a shareholder starts after the full 
capital contribution has been completed.  This regulation is important to prevent emerging of 
multiple voting rights which has been abolished as mentioned above.  If a shareholder had 
voting power before full capital contribution is done, this voting power would give him higher 
voting power proportionally higher than his equity participation, which would create de facto a 
share class similar to multiple voting rights.120 
e) § 139 AktG 
The general legitimacy to issue preference shares without voting power is set in § 12 
AktG, as mentioned above and § 139 AktG regulates how and within which limits preference 
shares can be issued.121  The conditions which are set in § 139 AktG are final and mandatory 
and the voting power must be either fully taken away or not at all.122  It is not possible to give 
preference shares only partial voting power. 
Section 139 I sent. 2 AktG requires that shareholders with preference shares either 
receive an advanced dividend payment or a higher dividend payment relative to shareholders 
with common shares.  This requirement creates a loophole through which a corporation can 
grant preference shareholders an advanced dividend payment, while ultimately paying the 
common shareholders a higher dividend payment.  Therefore, if a corporation has sufficient 
profit to make a dividend payment, although the preference shareholders may receive earlier 
payment than common shareholders, the common shareholders ultimately receive the higher 
payout. 
Section 139 I sent. 3 AktG defines that unless a corporation’s statue provides otherwise 
the advanced dividend must be refunded.  So if the preference has to be refunded the 
shareholders have a right to the entire preference dividend and a corporation cannot set in its 
statute to only refund partly,123 and this right cannot become time-barred.124 
                                                 
119 Koch, in: Hüffer § 134, recital 4. 
120 Winkler, Das Stimmrecht der Aktionäre in der Europäischen Union, P. 15. 
121 Schröer, in: MüKo § 139, recital 1. 
122 Id. at recital 6. 
123 Id. at recital 16. 
124 Hirschmann, in: Hölters § 139, recital 14. 
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The voting power of preference shareholders is not fully extinct.125  They still have a 
rudimentary voting power that resurges if the preference payout fails to appear or if special 
resolutions have to be decided.126 
Section 139 II AktG defines that only half of the share capital can be issued as preference 
shares without voting power.  This regulation is mandatory and cannot be changed in the 
statute.127  This ensures that the majority of voting power cannot be represented by shareholders 
only holding a minority of capital.128 
f) § 140 AktG129 
Section 140 AktG defines the legal position of preference shareholders.  Section 140 I 
AktG sets that preference shareholders enjoy the same rights as common shareholders except 
for the voting rights.130  Section 140 II AktG addresses the question how the voting power 
resurges if the dividend payout has been absent.  Here the law distinguishes between refundable 
and non-refundable dividend payouts. 
With refundable payouts the voting power only does not resurge if the shareholder is 
payed the dividend payout missing in the previous year, and the payout due for the current 
year.131  So if one of the two dividends cannot be payed, a preference shareholder’s voting rights 
resurge to the same power as the power of a common shareholder. 
Section 140 II sent. 2 AktG defines the requirements for the resurgence of the voting 
power of preference shares with non-refundable dividend payout-rights.  Here the voting power 
only resurges if a corporation does not pay out the dividend to the preference shareholder in 
two years in a row.132  So if a corporation does not pay a dividend in one year the preference 
shareholders remain empty-handed.  As long as preference shares enjoy voting rights they also 
have to be taken into consideration for the calculation of the controlling interest of the 
corporation.133 
Section 140 III AktG defines that if preference shares enjoy the right of refundable 
dividend payouts that right cannot be given up independently from the share without a change 
                                                 
125 Heider, in: MüKo § 12, recital 32. 
126 Id. 
127 Hirschmann, in: Hölters § 139, recital 24. 
128 Id. 
129 Gesetz zur Änderung des Aktiengesetzes (Aktienrechtsnovelle 2016), in the version of December 22nd, 2015, 
BGBl I, 2015, 2565 (2566). 
130 Liebscher, in: Hennsler/Arnold § 140, recital 1. 
131 Schröer/Doralt, in: MüKo § 140, recital 9. 
132 Gesetz zur Änderung des Aktiengesetzes (Aktienrechtsnovelle 2016), in the version of December 22nd, 2015, 
BGBl I, 2015, 2565 (2566). 
133 Liebscher, in: Hennsler/Arnold § 140, recital 7. 
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of the corporations statute.134  According to § 141 I AktG135 such a change of the corporations 
statute, changing the preference rights of one share class needs to be agreed by the affected 
shareholders.136  Section 141 III AktG sets that the shareholders have to determine this 
agreement in a separate resolution.137  Section 141 III AktG moreover requires a three-quarter 
majority for the separate resolution.138  These majority requirements are mandatory and cannot 
be raised or reduced in the corporation’s statute.139 
 Dual class shares versus “one-share, one-vote” 
After seeing that the dual class share system is gaining popularity in Germany the 
question comes up if dual class shares are an actual competitor of the “one-share, one-vote” 
principle.  In the following the question of an economic, ethical and moral justification of dual 
class shares is going to be asked and the pros and cons of both systems are going to be weighed 
against each other. 
 Justification of a dual class share system 
A market always operates with the information that is available about a corporation.  
From an economic point of view the question is how dual class shares perform on the market 
compared to common shares.140  The comparison of the DAX 30 corporations that have issued 
preference shares shows that the arbitrage between the share values of the share classes 
varies.141  For a few corporations the share price of preference shares is higher, at others it is 
the same and at some it is lower.142  This shows that preference shares perform about as well as 
common shares on the market.  So corporations with a dual class share system have no minor 
performance on the market than corporations with “one-share, one-vote” which justifies the 
dual class share system from an economic point of view. 
The question of an ethical justification of a dual class share system is not simple to be 
answered with yes or no in general.  In fact every corporation needs to be considered 
individually.  One can say that a corporation acts ethically correct when it follows the general 
corporate governance standards.143  So the question comes up if it is ethically correct that in a 
corporation like Schaeffler the entire voting power is held by two people who only hold a way 
                                                 
134 Id. at recital 8. 
135 Aktiengesetz (AktG), in the version of September 6th, 1965, BGBl I, 1965, 1089 (1122). 
136 Liebscher, in: Hennsler/Arnold § 141, recital 2. 
137 Koch, in: Hüffer § 141, recital 18. 
138 Bormann, in: Spindler/Stilz § 141, recital 55. 
139 Id. at recital 56. 
140 Taylor, Dueling shares: comparative EU-US corporate governance practices (2013), P. 5. 
141 Kruse, Stämme oder Vorzüge? So nutzen Sie die Spreads - Boersengefluester. 
142 Id. 
143 Taylor, Dueling shares: comparative EU-US corporate governance practices (2013), P. 8. 
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smaller part of the corporation’s equity.  In this case the shareholders need to trust the family 
to make responsible decisions in the best interest of the shareholders.  But there are also 
stakeholders in a corporation whose interests also need to be considered.  So a corporation with 
a dual class share system can be ethically justified if it acts in the best interest of the 
shareholders without voting power as well as in the best interest of its employees and managers. 
In recent years claims came up to put a ban on dual class shares because the system of 
shares without voting power would be immoral.144  But preference shares do not just bring the 
disadvantage of no voting rights, preference shares can also grant a higher dividend payout.  So 
eradicating preference shares would also eradicate a good investment option for shareholders 
who are more interested in high returns than voting power.145  A potential investor can inform 
himself prior to an investment and can decide whether he wants to invest to the given conditions 
or not.  So if dual class shares are morally justified or not, is on every investor to decide for 
himself. 
 The advantage of a dual class share system 
As mentioned before the dual class share system was used in the 1980s as a hostile 
takeover protection.  But a corporation with a “one-share, one-vote” system is not completely 
defenceless.  A corporation could issue registered shares only with restricted transferability 
(vinkulierte Namensaktien) instead of simple registered shares (Namensaktien) or bearer shares 
(Inhaberaktien).  The difference between bearer shares and registered shares regards that the 
name of shareholders who hold registered shares is known whereas the shareholder of bearer 
shares stays anonymous.146  In both classes the shares can change the shareholder without 
permission of the corporation.  Registered shares with restricted transferability are different.  A 
shareholder who holds such shares needs a statutory permission of the corporation to sell his 
shares to another shareholder.147  So if a corporation only issues registered shares with restricted 
transferability it can control who holds the shares and can therefore prevent hostile takeovers.  
As clarified one can see that corporations without dual class shares can also create a 
system that prevents hostile takeovers.  But the most common reason why corporations are 
issuing preference shares arise from the need to raise capital while keeping the voting power 
within a small circle. 
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In recent years Contingent Convertible Bonds (CoCo-Bonds) gained popularity at 
financial institutes in Europe.148  This increase’s due to the European and national legislators 
who want financial institutes to be more resistant at financial crisis so that the taxpayers don’t 
need to suffer under another bank rescue.149  CoCo-Bonds are loan capital, which offer the 
lender a return of about seven percent.150  But if the capital buffer of the financial institute goes 
beneath a threshold value the CoCo-Bonds are going to be either transferred into shares or 
written off temporarily.151  So the loan capital is going to be transferred into equity.152  The 
Deutsche Bank for instance chose to issue CoCo-Bonds that are not going to be transferred into 
shares but written off.153  One can see that CoCo-Bonds have similar characteristics to shares, 
because if the corporation suffers financially CoCo-Bonds and shares are going to be worth 
less.  But CoCo-Bonds have the advantage that no voting power has to be given away.  So 
CoCo-Bonds are an instrument for corporations with “one-share, one-vote” to raise capital and 
still keep the power within a small circle.  But this brings up the question whether CoCo-Bonds 
and registered shares with restricted transferability can be more easily justified than dual class 
shares, and whether they present greater ethical concerns.  And again this question can mostly 
only be answered by every investor himself. 
Dual class shares are in direct competition with the “one-share, one-vote” principle, but 
the market for capital structures is not zero sum.  Dual class and “one-share, one-vote” 
structures can coexist.  Each corporation must choose what type of structure to adopt and in 
response, investors can determine whether they want to invest their money in these structures 
or not. 
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Part 2: US Law by: Katie Bentel 
Because dual-class-stock use implicates so many other areas of corporate governance, the 
conflict regarding its use has been drawn out and its resolution delayed to an even greater 
extent than would otherwise be the case.154 
I. Introduction 
Dual class stock creates a distinct type of controlled company that permits corporate insiders 
to retain majority voting control while allowing investors to share an economic stake in the 
company.  Because of this unbundling of corporate governance and economic interest, dual 
class structures have received a significant amount of regulatory attention, with academics and 
policymakers advocating strongly both for and against their value as a governance mechanism.  
This has resulted, some argue, in a degree of regulation on the subject that is “disproportionate 
to the commonality of its use.”155 
Dual class structures are not limited to the United States.  Such structures have received 
highly varied receptions across the globe.  For instance, in European countries with domestic 
markets historically dominated by family-owned businesses, such as France and Italy, the dual 
class structure presents an attractive opportunity for these companies to engage with the public 
market, and its capital, without sacrificing the family-directed development of the corporation.  
In Asia, dual class stock is employed as a means to maintain centralized, insider control, but 
“controlling minority structures” that better obscure this tight grip, such as pyramid schemes 
and cross-ownership structures, are favored.156  As is typical in the United States, in most of 
these instances, adopting a dual class structure permits a company to access the capital markets 
while also perpetuating its already-established control.  However, in the U.S., adopting a dual 
class structure may also enable management to regain control of an already-public company 
with dispersed ownership.  Efforts to reverse ownership dispersion are not endogenous to the 
U.S., but the already-dispersed nature of U.S. corporate ownership creates greater opportunities 
for recentralized control. 
Conversely, some jurisdictions have policies restricting corporate structures to one-share, 
one-vote, including Russia, India, and South Korea.  Hong Kong also maintains a one-share, 
one-vote standard but allows for exceptions to that rule on a case-by-case basis.  However, the 
Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong chose not to permit an exception for 
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Alibaba’s 2014 listing, losing the largest IPO in history to the NYSE.  The Hong Kong 
government supported the Commission’s decision to reject Chinese e-commerce giant 
Alibaba’s proposal for an exception to the one-share, one-vote rule, arguing that dual class stock 
is best suited for places like the U.S. because that have a deep institutional investor base as well 
as a litigious culture that can act as an additional check on company management.157 
Permitting dual class stock, or its prohibition, has important ramifications for the 
shareholder-manager relationship and the cadre of policing mechanisms available.  This section 
will address the rise of dual class stock in the United States and regulatory responses to its 
development.  It will also consider the uniquely autonomous position occupied by the securities 
exchanges in the U.S. and their relationship to state corporate law, as well as an analysis of the 
ramifications, both positive and negative of permitting dual class structures. 
II. Rise of Dual Class Shares 
Dual class stocks were first utilized in media companies as a means to protect the 
journalistic integrity of the news.  In the early 1900s, state corporation statutes began to adopt 
one-share, one-vote principles as a default rule, but dual class structures remained accessible 
and eventually grew in popularity as a tool for raising capital.158  The use of dual class structures 
reentered common practice and expanded beyond the media industry in the 1980s during a 
period when the market corporate control became hotly contested.159  Arguably, this trajectory 
reveals that management entrenchment is the true motivation for adopting a dual class structure.  
The current growth of dual class companies is stimulated by high-tech and social media 
companies, especially those managed by powerful, vision-driven CEOs.160  For these 
companies, non-voting stock classes are especially attractive so as not to dilute the voting power 
of insider shareholders seeking to implement the corporate vision.  Courts have upheld this 
justification under the theory of investors’ freedom to contract.161  However, the original 
concentration of dual class structures within the media persists.  Over the previous decade the 
number of corporations in the S&P 1500162 with a dual class structure increased substantially, 
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rising from 87 in 2002 to 114 in 2012.163  The S&P 1500 groups corporations by their industry; 
of the industry groups considered by the index, at 53 percent, the media industry has the highest 
percentage of companies with a dual class share structure.164  Food, Beverage, and Tobacco, 
the industry with the second highest percentage of companies with a dual class structure, 
measures only 20.4 percent.165   
III. SEC Regulation of Dual Class Shares 
Shareholder voting rights are largely regulated by state law, despite the SEC’s increasing 
influence on the shareholder-management relationship.166  The Securities Exchange Act does 
not, on its face, empower the SEC to regulate matters of corporate governance, instead granting 
the SEC explicit regulating authority over trade and pricing.167  However, the SEC maintains 
that “voting rights are fundamental and a majority of shareholders should not be able to vote to 
diminish or eliminate the voting rights of an opposed minority.”168 
In 1986, SEC Commissioner Charles C. Cox addressed the New York Stock Exchange on 
“Dual Class Capitalization: Solutions in Search of Problems” and discussed the viability of a 
one-share, one-vote rule.  Commissioner Cox framed a one-share, one-vote rule as the potential 
answer to three concerns: competition between stock exchanges arising from disparate 
exchange-created rules, upholding the primacy of shareholder democracy, and discerning the 
SEC’s proper role in corporate governance.169  Commissioner Cox expressed his concern that 
the lack of uniformity between the exchanges was creating a “race to the bottom,” with the 
exchanges furthering their own interests in attracting listings to the detriment of shareholders.170  
More broadly, Commissioner Cox warned that permitting non-voting or reduced-voting shares 
could trigger a “market failure” in which the price of shares does not accurately reflect their 
(restricted) attributes.171  Commissioner Cox framed the adoption of a dual class structure as a 
disclosure concern, and thus under the SEC’s purview.172  Commissioner Cox’s address raised 
foundational questions addressing the proper scope of shareholders’ right to vote, including 
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whether they should be empowered to “disenfranchise themselves” and whether, if the 
shareholder vote is indeed a fundamental right, the SEC regulate it as a norm. 
Unsurprisingly, many have taken a more restrictive view of the SEC’s regulatory authority.  
Bainbridge argues that the thrust of the SEC’s regulatory efforts is on disclosure requirements, 
and that the Commission should leave the regulation of voting rights to the states.173  
Commissioner Cox’s address to the NYSE precipitated the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 19c-4 
in 1988, the apex of the one-share, one-vote movement.174  Rule 19c-4 focused on regulating 
transactions deemed to disenfranchise voters; it permitted issuers to issue new classes of non-
voting stock, or a special class with limited voting rights, provided the issuance did not dilute 
the voting power of existing shareholders; Rule 19c-4 also permitted the issuance of a second 
class of stock in the context of a merger or acquisition with a bona fide business purpose.175  
Although Rule 19c-4 received strong support during the comment period (boasting an 
impressive 1000:10 letters in support of its passage), the D.C. Circuit determined that Rule 19c-
4 was beyond the SEC’s regulatory authority when the Business Roundtable challenged it in 
1990.176  The Business Roundtable decision dealt a hard blow to the SEC’s perceived authority, 
as the rule was harshly criticized for going against principles of federalism.177  Additionally, in 
the course of litigation the SEC damningly “conceded that it does not have ‘unlimited authority 
to amend SRO rules in areas of ‘corporate governance.’”178  With the Business Roundtable 
decision, the SEC’s authority to regulate dual class shares was strongly curtailed, leaving the 
responsibility to other interests, including the government and the exchanges themselves. 
IV. Government Legislation 
Academics and the government have long driven the discussion regarding a prohibition on 
dual class structures.  The movement did not gain popular momentum until the Dillon, Reed & 
Company sold a combination of debentures, preferred and non-voting common stock in Dodge 
Brothers to retain control for itself in the mid-1920s.179  In 1934, Congress promulgated an 
aspirational policy on corporate voting rights, noting that “[f]air corporate suffrage is an 
important right that should attach to every equity security bought on a public exchange.”180  
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Fifty years later, the D.C. Circuit would interpret the legislative focus to be on full disclosure 
and fair solicitation, rather than regulating voting rights. 
Because the SEC’s power to regulate shareholder voting rights has been judicially 
restricted, any impetus for greater federal regulation will have to come either from Congress or 
the shareholders themselves.  State corporation law occupies the gap left by federal regulators.  
Currently, most states maintain a default one-share, one-vote rule, but state “blue sky” 
provisions sometimes allow for the sale of shares with disparate voting rights, which can 
withstand judicial review.181  As such, the principle of one-share, one-vote remains a 
“touchstone of corporate governance.” 182  Because state law governs the legal viability of dual 
class structuring, an important relationship that exists between state corporate law and the stock 
exchanges. 
V. Stock Markets: Regulator and Regulated 
The prominence of the forum shopping that preceded Alibaba’s record-breaking IPO serves 
as an apt reminder that the global securities exchanges exist in a competitive environment, and 
none has monopolistic power.  They must constantly evaluate their competitive position 
amongst the exchanges both nationally and worldwide, as well as the competitive position of 
the firms they list.183 
The U.S. securities markets have long wrestled with how best to address dual class 
structures.  In 1924, the NYSE announced that dual class structures would be subjected to 
increased scrutiny; 184 in 1940, that policy hardened into a mandatory one-share, one-vote 
policy, setting itself apart from the other securities exchanges.185 The 1940 Policy prohibited 
the issuance of non-voting stock and the Exchange maintained a case-by-case system of 
evaluating attempts to adopt a dual class structure, rejecting the majority of attempts.  The 1940 
Policy was not challenged until 1984 after General Motors was permitted to issue restricted 
shares in conjunction with its acquisition of Electronic Data Systems Corporation.186  Although 
it was uncommon for companies to adopt a dual class structure at the time, the repercussions of 
this structural change by such a large corporation were sufficient to trigger a reevaluation. 
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In 1985, the NYSE designated a Subcommittee on Shareholder Participation and 
Qualitative Listing Standards to recommend a policy for the NYSE to adopt regarding dual 
class listings.  The proposed policy required two-thirds of shareholders to approve the creation 
of a second class of stock in addition to approval by a majority of independent directors (or the 
unanimous approval of all independent directors if the board does not have a majority of 
independent directors), the maintenance of a 10:1 ratio of voting rights between the enhanced 
shares and the second class of shares, and that all other rights be substantially the same.187  The 
1985 subcommittee proposal was developed under the assumption that shareholders should 
have substantial latitude to determine the corporate structure and that other safeguards (such as 
independent directors and auditors) are sufficient to ensure good governance.188  More cynically 
interpreted, the policy could also reflect the competition the NYSE was facing from both 
AMEX and NASD, as well as listed companies’ general dissatisfaction with the rigidity of the 
previous rule.  The NYSE’s 1985 proposition served as a trigger for the SEC’s promulgation of 
Rule 19c-4.189 
In 1990, AMEX followed the NYSE with a proposal of its own to replace the Wang 
formula, which had been adopted in 1976, which required a minimum of 10:1 voting rights 
between the classes of stock, disallowed the issuance of non-voting stock, and required the 
holders of reduced voting stock to determine 25% of directors.190  The 1990 AMEX proposal 
sought to balance flexible capital structuring and managerial accountability by requiring the 
approval of either two-thirds of outstanding shares or a majority of shares unaffiliated with 
management or the controlling group.191 
Presently, NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX each permit dual class stock listings by 
corporations as long as the dual class structure was in place at the time of the IPO.192  Both the 
NYSE and NASD maintain standards “that embody the spirit of Rule 19c-4.”  However, the 
NYSE does not enforce this standard, instead providing interpretive guidance for listing 
companies.193  This places competitive pressure on the other exchanges, particularly NASDAQ, 
which must enforce the 19c-4 standard in order to continue offering blue sky exemptions.  
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Further, the NYSE’s case-by-case analysis of the standards exacerbates the uncertainty already 
associated with dual class structures.194 
Alongside Alibaba, several other highly valuable international corporations have also 
chosen to list on the NYSE in response to other exchanges’ limitations on dual class listings, 
including British soccer team Manchester United and Chinese social media company Weibo.  
Dual class structures do not serve as the only attraction for foreign companies considering 
listing on a U.S. exchange, federal regulations such as the JOBS Act and Rule 405 of the 
Securities Act also incentivize international companies to choose U.S. markets.  Despite the 
apparent policy continuity between the exchanges and the government, Wen cautions that “[w]e 
should be wary of the potentially disastrous consequences of welcoming companies that are 
listing in the United States solely to avoid their home countries’ regulations or to avoid having 
to disclose information to investors.”195  This call to caution invokes the same concerns that 
motivated restrictive policies for domestic companies in the 1980s and indicates that the focus 
for exchanges is not on shareholder protection, but on setting minimum corporate governance 
standards. 
VI. Dual Class Shares: An Analysis 
 The value, or danger, of dual class structures remains highly contested, with a myriad of 
interested parties contributing to the discussion.  Regardless of the specific terms of a dual class 
stock proposal, the “effect would be to significantly unbundle corporate governance from 
economic participation.”196  Because shareholder voting arrangements are intimately connected 
with corporate governance policy, academics have enjoyed a prominent role in this 
conversation, mounting arguments both for and against dual class shares depending on whether 
they believe rules should serve to regulate all parties on a level playing field or to promote 
freedom to contract.197  Some further argue that the corporation is a social and political 
institution as much as it is an economic institution, and should therefore operate for the public 
benefit as much as for the benefit of the shareholders and directors.198 
1. Effect on Management & Corporation 
Proponents of dual class structures argue that allowing insider, controlling shareholders 
to retain dominant voting rights enables company directors to promote a long-term vision for 
the company and encourages stronger investment in long-term considerations like research and 
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development, which might not generate an immediate return on investment (as opposed to sales 
and advertising), without being limited by the short-term interests motivating retail 
shareholders.  Often, the stock with enhanced trading rights cannot be traded or loses its 
enhanced voting rights when it is traded under a “sunset provision.”199  This further ensures a 
loyal base of committed investors, allowing founders pursue their long-term vision. 
However, opponents counter that alternatives to dual class structures abound; managers 
can choose to finance their vision through debt, raise venture or equity capital, sell fewer shares 
so they retain control, or they can simply choose to remain a private company.  Additionally, 
the benefits of dual class structures can be highly dependent on the particular managers in place 
when the structure is adopted.  Often shareholders investing in shares with reduced voting 
power are investing in an individual’s vision for the company, and the sacrifice of voting rights 
may become costly when the “next generation” of management gains control.  The resulting 
“power vacuum” left by the exit of a particularly charismatic or innovative company leader can 
further exacerbate this effect. 
The dual class structure serves as a powerful (and possibly bulletproof) defense against 
takeover bids.  Wen argues that a dual class structure does not offer notably enhanced protection 
if companies already have other antitakeover mechanisms in place, and therefore the potential 
protective benefits are not sufficient to justify the shareholder disenfranchisement that results 
from a dual class structure.200  However, the impenetrability of this structure also creates a 
mechanism for equally impenetrable management entrenchment, with no accountability 
measures through shareholder action available.201  Indeed, even after they were criminally 
implicated in a phone-hacking investigation, their own voting power enabled Rupert and James 
Murdoch to retain their positions as Chairman and CEO, respectively, at News Corp.202  
Although a dual class structure cannot be implemented in response to a hostile advance,203 it 
has been argued that such concentrated board voting power can negate the governance 
protections afforded by independent board members204 and that management will no longer be 
incentivized to seek value maximization of the firm because there will never be a looming threat 
of takeover, ultimately resulting in reduced shareholder wealth.205  However, empirical 
evidence that controlling shareholders do not act with the purpose of expropriating power and 
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wealth from minority shareholders exists206 and argubly, were these structures wholly 
undesirable structures for the market, such a large quantity of corporations would not continue 
to operate (successfully) under dual class structures.  Wen, however, further cautions that, 
because shareholders cannot effectively monitor boards in a dual class structure, that 
monitoring duty shifts to third parties such as the courts and regulatory bodies, with the resulting 
costs borne by the public.207 
2. Effect on Shareholders 
Some have argued that shareholders in a dual class structure are denied the opportunity 
to capitalize on the “control premium” that develops when management inefficiencies occur 
and a company’s share price declines as a result.208  In these instances, a corporate takeover can 
maximize corporate value quickly by correcting these inefficiencies, allowing shareholders to 
reap the benefits.  This potential benefit is unavailable if management is able to continue poor 
governance practices without the threat of a takeover.209  Empirical research seems to support 
the assumption that a control premium can develop in a dual class context; although controlled 
companies tend to outpace non-controlled companies in the short term, voting control that is 
disproportionately greater than managers’ ownership stakes in the company weakens company 
performance.210  One possible explanation for this is that shareholders with enhanced voting 
rights are reluctant to sell their shares to raise corporate funds for fear of diluting their influence.  
This theory of self-interested decision-making at the expense of the corporation is supported by 
empirical evidence that dual class structures demonstrably underperform relative to all other 
control structures (included single-share controlled companies)211 and tend to be burdened with 
more debt than their single-class counterparts.212 
Some view dual class stock as an “unnecessary evil” because other takeover defense 
mechanisms exist that do not also inherently implicate shareholder disenfranchisement.  These 
critics argue that the only justification for choosing a dual class structure as a takeover defense 
is that it has the added benefit of management entrenchment.213  However, some courts have 
interpreted management entrenchment as a violation of management’s duty of care; as such, 
the choice to adopt a dual class structure should only be made when the purpose of the structure, 
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especially in the recapitalization context, is clearly not to perpetuate existing management.  
Recapitalizing under a dual class structure is subject to even greater scrutiny because although 
shareholders nearly always vote to approve a dual class recapitalization, arguably this vote 
cannot ever be truly informed (and therefore cannot be judicially enforced) because 
shareholders systematically undervalue their right to vote.214  However, Barry et al. cite 
evidence contradicting this assumption, arguing that voting rights are highly valued by investors 
because shares conferring greater voting rights typically command higher prices.215  Further, 
courts have historically enforced such votes, indicating that this perception is dominant. 
Indeed, Ashton rejects the assumption that dual class structures lead to 
disenfranchisement, arguing “[i]t does not necessarily follow that an unequal relationship 
between voting power and residual interest invariably creates larger agency costs or 
inefficiencies.”216  This argument is corroborated by Adams and Ferreira, with limitation. 
Ashton presents the dual class structure as an opportunity to benefit some shareholders (those 
holding shares with enhanced voting power) without hurting others by manipulating the vote 
and the value attached to it so as to maximize the aggregate value of the firm, invoking the 
Coase theorem, which characterizes corporate restructuring proposals as a negotiation between 
existing shareholders and management that acts to reduce transaction costs in a regulatory 
environment that does not place restrictions on capital structuring.217  Ashton asserts that in the 
absence of such costly regulations, shareholders and management would engage in voluntary 
exchanges, reducing transaction costs.  While Adams and Ferreira agree that disparate voting 
rights are not per se disenfranchising, “it is only under very restrictive assumptions that 
maximizing social welfare coincides with maximizing shareholder value.”218 
An important criticism of dual class structures posits that the fiduciary duties of 
managers are owed to all shareholders, but a concentrated dual class ownership structure 
effectively limits accountability for that duty to the few shareholders in power.219  Taken 
further, it is reasonable to anticipate that this limitation of accountability to shareholders will 
result in fewer shareholder proposals if controlling voting power is concentrated within the 
board, thereby further reducing the effectiveness of that avenue for shareholder monitoring.220 
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Under a dual class structure, some protections do remain for shareholders, including 
company disclosure, common law fiduciary duties, and public pressure (or shaming).221  
Importantly, public pressure can also present a reputational challenge and policy keel for 
exchanges hosting dual class corporations if public perception trends towards suspicion of the 
quality of the governance of either the corporations or the exchanges.  However, it is 
questionable whether these alternate shareholder protections are sufficient to surmount the 
morals-driven public policy counterargument that voting rights are a “minimal, fail-safe 
constraint on the integrity, diligence and competence of those who manage publicly traded 
corporations.”222  An additional concern is that dual class structures can exacerbate the 
collective action, free riding, and passivity problems inherent in dispersed ownership – leading 
to further disenfranchisement.223  Ashton argues that retail investors face heightened costs to 
oppose a dual class recapitalization proposal because dual class restructurings tend to occur in 
the family-owned companies or companies controlled by management and under the watch of 
less vigilant institutional investors.  This cost of opposition deters action by individual 
shareholders and perpetuates the free riding problem.224 
 3. Effect on the Market 
Regardless of the effect of dual class shares on an individual firm’s value, dual class 
structures also implicate concerns for their effect on the market as a whole.  Wen focuses on 
agency costs, rather than transaction costs, asserting that “[h]aving a proportionate economic 
interest is desirable because a market-oriented approach is the optimal way to lower agency 
costs.”225  Unbundling voting rights and profit claims has “potentially significant 
consequences” on market-wide agency costs because it reduces the potency of internal 
monitoring mechanisms available to shareholders as principals in the agency relationship.226  
Michael Jacobs argues that unbundling voting rights and economic interest will undermine 
capitalism because those making business decisions are betting with someone else’s 
investment.227  Additionally, financial risk accrues disproportionately to investors who don’t 
have control of their investment, which is patently unfair.  Jacobs describes dual class structures 
as a violation of the golden rule: “he who has the gold sets the rules.”228  One can imagine a 
worst-case scenario in which the perception of shareholder disenfranchisement and the risk of 
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management entrenchment reach such as level that investors lose faith in the market and pull 
their investments out entirely.229  The market-wide effects extend beyond investor confidence 
in the markets, and may also affect the perceived cost of capital.  Shares issued with reduced 
voting power have a lower per-share value than they would if they also carried full voting 
power; this results in an increased cost of capital for the corporation to derive the same value 
from investors.230 
Proponents of dual class stocks argue under the contract theory of rulemaking that the 
only risk is to those (informed) shareholders who choose to invest at the IPO stage, as any 
inherent shareholder risk or disenfranchisement has been priced into the IPO.  They further 
assert that prohibitively regulating dual class structures competitively disadvantages firms for 
which the structure would be optimal and interferes with the market’s natural enforcement 
mechanisms.231  However, the current thrust of dual class listings is centered on popular, highly 
marketed corporations such as Google, Facebook, and Yelp, which are likely to attract a wider 
investment base, putting more retail investors at risk of disenfranchisement.  Although it has 
been suggested that concerned investors may simply have to miss out on investing in a 
compelling business that elects to have a dual class structure,232 in practice index investors and 
many institutions cannot actively avoid dual class companies.233 
Institutional investors play a significant role in the American securities market and have 
shown distaste for dual class structures.  However, the advised policies and actual practices of 
institutional investors differ significantly.  Institutions still invest in dual class companies with 
great frequency and in high volume because a corporation’s shareholder voting structure (and 
other corporate governance issues) is a relatively low priority for institutional investors in 
making investment decisions, especially at the IPO stage.  As powerful participants in the 
markets, institutional investors provide important corporate governance oversight and can aid 
in overcoming the collective action problem associated with dispersed ownership.  However, 
oversight by institutional investors is an incomplete monitoring mechanism because 
institutional investors are not incentivized to consider long-term managerial overreach or abuse, 
but rather to focus on short-term profit gain.234 This results in mission misalignment between 
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individual investors and institutional investors and requires individual investors to continue to 
serve a (potentially costly) monitoring function, particularly with a long-term perspective. 
VII. Conclusion 
 The future of dual class shares in the U.S. is uncertain, even as regulatory bodies grapple 
with how to address the creation of dual class structures, new governance challenges loom.  
Among these challenges are how to regulate recapitalizations of dual class firms into single 
class corporations, as contemplated in Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader’s Digest 
Association,235 and the development of other mechanisms for decoupling economic and voting 
rights, such as Google’s introduction of a class of nonvoting shares as part of an employee stock 
incentive program in 2012236 or the concept of “time-phased voting” or loyalty shares, which 
rewards long-term shareholders with increased voting power.237  It is clear that there is not a 
universal structure that will best suit all corporate entities; instead, companies must engage in 
a lengthy process of trial and error.238  This trial and error should be supported by clear 
regulatory guidance, though it is unclear what entity is best suited to navigate corporations 
through the uncertainties that permeate the dual-class structure.  
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Comparative Part         by: Katie Bentel and Gabriel Walter 
 
I. Introduction 
After having shown how dual class shares are used and regulated in Germany and the 
U.S., the final section of this paper will compare the use and regulation of dual class shares in 
Germany to the system used in the U.S., as well as some of the distinctions between German 
dual class regulations and the regulations of other EU countries, assessing the implications for 
corporate law in each of these jurisdictions. 
Beginning with the origins of dual class shares, we first discuss the varied incentives 
for corporations to issue dual class shares and why the respective governments permitted the 
issuance of dual class shares.  We then consider the different voting classes permitted between 
Germany and the U.S. and the effect of these regulations on the behavior of dual class 
corporations in each country.  We then assess the broader enforcement environment for 
corporate law in the EU and the U.S., considering the different uses of hard and soft law to 
induce compliance and the role of private enforcement through litigation in each jurisdiction.  
We finally compare the disparate rights granted to shareholders of different classes in 
Germany and the U.S., including the right to receive dividend payments and the right to resale 
shares. 
We conclude with a view to the future of dual class structures in Germany and the 
U.S., predicting that global capital markets regulation will continue to converge and that 
corporations taking advantage of dual class structures are likely to continue to forge new 
pathways to disentangle economic and control rights of shareholders. 
1. Origins of the Dual Class Structure 
Railway corporations were the first to adopt dual class shares systems in Germany, 
beginning in 1844. A half-century later, towards the end of the 19th century, U.S. 
corporations also began to adopt dual class structures.239  Between 1926 and 1985, the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) prohibited dual class shares with few exceptions.   One such 
exception was made for the Ford Motor Company, which still able to issue preference shares 
because its preference shares were not non-voting shares, but rather shares with minor voting 
power.240  The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) did not adopt a similar prohibition against 
dual class shares, but also restricted their issuance.241  These restrictions included, inter alia, 
that preference shares could only be issued with minor voting rights, making the AMEX 
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practice nearly indistinguishable from the NYSE’s prohibition in practice.  Conversely, 
preference shares have never been prohibited in Germany and have been legally sanctioned by 
the German Stock Corporation Act since 1937.  Nonetheless, from the 1920s until the early 
1980s the dual class share system was limited to very narrow industries, such as transportation 
and media companies, in both Germany and the U.S. 
During the 1980s, hostile takeovers increased in both Germany and the U.S., making 
the dual class share system an attractive and effective source of hostile takeover protection.242  
Whereas in Germany, neither the legislator nor the stock exchanges changed the necessary 
conditions for the issuance dual class shares, in the U.S. the NYSE responded to this increase 
in dual class structures by relaxing their prohibition, allowing the issuance of dual class shares 
on a case-by-case basis in an effort to remain competitive with the AMEX and the NASDAQ, 
which emerged in 1971.243  During the 1980s, the increased threat of hostile takeover and the 
permissibility of dual class structures on all of the major stock exchanges led to an increase of 
the use of dual class shares in the U.S. and in Germany. 
In Germany and other countries in Europe such as Italy and France, early dual class 
structures were often used by family owned companies, or companies that have family-like 
structures, such as Volkswagen AG.  The dual class structure was attractive for founding 
families that had invested a significant amount of time, energy, and funding into their 
companies and that wanted to raise capital but did not want to give controlling power to 
foreign, unknown investors after going public. 
In the U.S., the common motivation for adopting a dual class structure was ostensibly 
less self-interested.  Most of the companies that took early advantage of the dual class 
structure were media companies like the Washington Post Company, the New York Times 
Company and News Corporation.244  In these cases, the main motive for retaining voting 
control within the corporation was not to protect a founding family’s interest, but to maintain 
journalistic integrity.245  For example, the Twenty-First Century Fox Corporation still 
maintains a dual class structure that gives the founder Rupert Murdoch and his family over 40 
percent of the voting power while holding only 12 percent of the corporation’s equity.246 
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2. Permissible Voting Classes 
The distinctions between the regulation of dual class shares in the U.S. and Germany 
begin at the foundation of the dual class structure – the permissible voting classes. 
As in the U.S., in Germany, dual class structures are both legal and common; however, 
unlike the U.S., the voting power granted to each class of shares is narrowly regulated in 
Germany.  Since 1998, only one class of voting shares is permissible under German law.247  
Ordinary (voting) shares receive one vote, while preference shares are non-voting.  This is 
because German corporate governance regulation is focused primarily on addressing potential 
conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and preference shareholders, rather than 
between shareholders and management, as in the U.S.248  The German focus on shareholder-
shareholder relations is likely a reflection of its stakeholder approach to corporate governance, 
which places additional checks on the unilateral authority of management by aligning the 
interests of employees and management.249 
The German approach, however, is inconsistent with the recent European trend, with 
both France and Italy passing legislation in the past two years promoting long-term 
shareholder investment through loyalty shares, which inherit double voting rights when held 
for over two years.250  Similarly, the U.S. has focused regulatory efforts on the proper process 
and associated disclosure obligations for creating multiple classes of stock, rather than the 
permissible voting rights of each class.  Federal regulation permits multiple classes of voting 
stock, permitting each class to be granted disparate voting rights, as well as the issuance of 
non-voting stock.  However, the individual securities exchanges each maintain distinct 
regulations regarding shareholder voting rights.  For instance the AMEX permits multiple 
classes of stock with voting rights, but requires that the ratio of voting power not exceed 10:1 
between enhanced voting shares and common shares.251 
In both countries, shareholders of classes with lesser voting rights are entitled to the 
same rights as those enjoyed by shareholders with enhanced voting rights, with the exception 
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of the right to vote.252  Additionally, any desired structural transformations after the 
company’s initial offering must be approved by a majority of existing shareholders.253  
However, the votes that the German and American frameworks permit to be assigned to each 
class of shares are highly disparate and have significant effects on the shareholder voting 
apparatus in each country. 
3. Hard law vs. soft law 
Both the U.S. and the EU use hard and soft law to protect the voting rights of 
shareholders, but in highly disparate ways, and with disparate effect.  Hard law refers to 
enforceable laws and binding legal instruments, such as treaties or customary laws, which 
create implementable rights and obligations.254  Soft law refers to rules that have no legally 
binding force, but act instead as guidelines or policy declarations.255 The term “soft law” is 
often criticised because it is not legally enforceable and is therefore only questionably 
“law.”256 
 Whereas the use of hard law is more common in the U.S., the EU relies more heavily 
on soft law and individual corporate governance codes in each of its member countries.257  
While there are many effective analogies that can be drawn between the EU and the U.S. 
federal government and between the member countries and the individual U.S. states, the 
legal enforcement power of each are quite disparate.  The EU emphasizes soft law more 
strongly because it is not a country, but a supranational institution.258  As such, the EU does 
not have its own independent enforcement power to require corporations to comply with its 
directives; instead its individual member states are required to enact domestic (hard) laws 
implementing its directives and bylaws.259  Comparatively, a company in violation of U.S. 
federal law may face federal civil or criminal penalties in addition to state sanctions. 
 In recent years there has been a shift towards greater EU-level decision-making 
regarding corporate law, and a corresponding challenge for member states to align their 
company law with these developments.260  The European Commission, the executive arm of 
the EU, asserts that this increased EU-level governance is justified because “[m]ore and more 
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European businesses operate on a cross-border basis and for that reason the corporate 
governance framework at national level is growing in importance,” making it clear that the 
EU is pursuing harmonisation and enhanced coordination of the member states’ corporate 
governance practices.261  It is possible that greater synchronization could grant European 
authorities more actionable power to hold non-compliant companies accountable.  However, 
attaining EU-wide harmonization is, unsurprisingly, easier said than done due to the various 
incentives and priorities motivating the many member states and the broad international 
cooperation necessary to pass EU legislation. 
 In the U.S., the implementation of enforceable policies does appear so insurmountable.  
At the federal level, the U.S. has focused regulatory efforts on disclosure, with enforcement 
powers delegated to the SEC, which regulates listed companies and can initiate investigations 
and legal action if a company is not in compliance.262  The Dodd-Frank Act, passed in the 
wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, is a recent example demonstrating the stronger 
central regulatory enforcement power that the SEC possesses; it has significantly more 
expansive authority to execute its investigative and enforcement powers than the respective 
powers granted to the EU.263 
 Another noteworthy difference is that the conversation about a flat, “one-share, one-
vote” requirement has already generated strong support in the EU.  While European scholars 
and legislators are already contemplating the viability of a ban on dual class shares, in the 
U.S. this conversation is not receiving similar attention, likely because U.S. corporate law 
grants the individual states significant discretion in determining what standards to set, and 
many states already maintain a “one-share, one-vote” default rule.  This demonstrates that the 
EU and the U.S. are approaching the role of the federal legislator in regulating share 
structures from very different perspectives.264  Further, following the financial crisis, the U.S. 
pursued a fast, tailored legislative response aimed at better protecting shareholders’ rights; 
conversely, the EU’s approach has been more expansive, requiring more time to develop a 
new, long-term vision for corporate governance and consumer protection in Europe, not only 
because it is constrained by the myriad of interests that must reach consensus, but also 
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because the Commission is pursuing a potential overhaul of the foundation of the governance 
structure.265 
 Finally, despite the financial instability that characterized much of the past two 
decades, neither the EU nor the U.S. has specifically addressed the validity (or legality) of 
dual class structures in the lens of corporate governance.  This relative silence from the 
legislative and regulatory bodies of both the EU and the U.S. would seem to indicate that, thus 
far, neither entity views corporate share structure as a sufficiently powerful intervening cause 
of financial crises, the concern for which has framed most of the recent major shifts in 
corporate law within the EU and the U.S., to merit stronger regulation. 
4. Role of litigation as an additional check on corporate governance 
Similar to the disparate uses of hard and soft law in the regulatory systems of the 
United States and Germany, the two also have fundamentally different approaches to the role 
of courts as a mechanism for regulating corporate governance. 
German corporate law permits suits roughly akin to class action suits only in very 
narrow circumstances, making the process very time consuming and costly for individual 
shareholders.266  Although there have been significant developments in the regulation of 
German capital markets that have pushed the German regulatory framework towards the 
Anglo-American model, including the empowerment of public and private enforcement 
mechanisms, these changes have strained German legal resources and “require immense effort 
in corporations, the government, law firms, and German academics.”267  Additionally, even as 
foreign institutional investors begin to acquire greater interest in German companies, high 
costs of “information, contact and action” deter institutional investors from pushing for strong 
corporate governance.268  This would indicate that there is not likely to be significant pressure 
on German regulatory bodies to make shareholder derivative suits more accessible in the near 
future. 
Some argue that the threat of litigation is a powerful enough mechanism in the U.S. to 
incentivise company directors to practice good corporate governance, even in the absence of 
minority shareholder-controlled voting or the threat of takeover.  However, U.S. reliance on 
litigation as a mechanism of shareholder empowerment may be misguided because suits are 
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often driven primarily by self-interested lawyers rather than self-empowered investors.269  
Admittedly, however, the scope and vigor of this enforcement is far greater than the SEC 
alone could obtain.270 
Baums and Scott conclude that “…the ability of shareholders to enforce the legal 
rights they do have is inefficient at best in the US and even more so in Germany.”271  Indeed, 
both regulatory frameworks seek to empower shareholders through private enforcement 
mechanisms, but fail to truly harness the full potential of the court systems as tools of 
corporate governance. 
5. Rights guaranteed to preference shareholders 
As previously explored, in Germany preference shareholders are not granted voting 
rights.  Instead, they are granted other preferences and priorities.  In Germany multiple voting 
rights and multiple classes of voting shares are expressly prohibited, whereas in the U.S. 
shares enjoying multiple voting rights are both permissible and common.272  In Germany, 
then, the dual class structure can only take one form: the share class with enhanced voting 
power has one vote per share, and the share class with minor voting power has zero votes per 
share.  In the U.S., the enhanced voting class in the U.S. can have multiple votes per share and 
the share class with minor voting power has one vote per share.  This demonstrates the 
distinct priorities between the German and the U.S. systems.  A shareholder in the U.S. with 
minor voting shares can still maintain some amount of voting power, whereas a German 
preference shareholder cannot.  While the U.S. does not prohibit the issuance of nonvoting 
shares, some U.S. stock exchanges, such as the AMEX, require the ratio of voting power 
between stock classes not exceed 10:1. 
  A unique element of German dual class structures is that a shareholder with minor 
voting power in Germany can assert their right to vote if corporation fails to pay the 
preference or priority dividend.  If asserted, the shareholder’s voting power remains in place 
until the corporation fulfils all of its duties.  The U.S. does not have such requirements for 
shares with lesser voting power; instead, individual corporations can choose to structure the 
rights of the share classes, reasoning that the investing public can make an informed 
investment decision. In both countries, the rights of shares with minor voting power can be 
designed with different investment incentives.  For example, a corporation can issue shares 
with minor power that are granted an earlier payout than shareholders with enhanced voting 
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rights and/or a higher payout, or minor voting shares that guarantee a dividend payment.  
Thus, even though the basic framework for dual class issuances is very different between 
Germany and the U.S., corporations in both countries retain some discretion in structuring the 
two classes so as to create different incentives for investors buying shares with minor voting 
rights. 
6. Limitations on resale of shares with enhanced voting power 
Much like the different rights accorded to shareholders with limited voting power in 
the United States and in Germany, so too are different rights guaranteed to holders of shares 
with enhanced voting power, particularly with respect to resale provisions.  In both countries, 
the company founders have an interest in maintaining managerial control of the company.  
For many German corporations, this interest is in preserving familial control of the company; 
for many American corporations, this interest is in allowing founders to pursue their vision 
without interference from minority shareholders.  These goals are accomplished by limiting 
the transferability of shares with enhanced voting power so as to ensure that voting power 
remains concentrated with the founders. 
In Germany, the right to transfer ordinary shares can be restricted by distributing 
“registered shares” instead of “bearer shares.”273  For purposes of exercising shareholder 
rights, only registered shareholders are legally recognized.274  Under restricted registered 
shares, the identity of the shareholder is linked to the share itself, and the corporation must 
approve any transfer.275  The procedure for selling a registered share requires both an 
agreement to sell and an agreement to transfer.276  However, given the frequency with which 
registered shares are employed, the capital markets have developed mechanisms to facilitate 
the transfer of registered shares, such as a presumption that “the person holding a registered 
share certificate containing an uninterrupted chain of endorsements…is the legitimate legal 
owner of the share”277 and a system developed in 1997 to meet the requirement that the 
purchaser acquire “actual or constructive possession of the share” (the Central Application for 
Settlement, Clearing and Depository Expansion-Registered Shares).278 
In the U.S., it is common for shares with enhanced voting power to be limited by 
“sunset provisions,” which are triggered when a certain event occurs, such as the death of a 
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founder, the passage of a certain period of time, or when the share is sold to a non-insider.  
Generally, these supervoting shares can only be transferred to family members or trusts of the 
beneficial owners.  An impermissible transfer will convert the enhanced voting share into 
ordinary voting shares.279  However, most sunset provisions are triggered by a “transfer of 
beneficial ownership,” which has been broadly construed.  For instance, if minority 
shareholders unite to collaboratively overcome the controlling shareholders, by unifying their 
minority interests, the corporation can assert that beneficial ownership was transferred to the 
insurgent group’s interest, rather than the individual shareholders’ thus triggering the 
conversion of the shares into limited voting stock.280  Because super-voting shares are not 
readily transferable, and often convert upon transfer, their valuation is highly speculative.281  
Furthermore, Gordon questions whether such onerous limitations on the transferability of 
common stock are legally enforceable at all.282 
The transferability of shares with enhanced voting rights in both Germany and the 
U.S. is controlled by the issuer and prioritizes the issuer’s best interests.  In both countries, 
policies on transferring supervoting shares can act as an additional mechanism to entrench 
company management.  However, Germany has developed procedures to better facilitate the 
transfer of registered shares, whereas the U.S. has permitted sunset provisions to hold 
investors holding supervoting shares hostage, or risk losing the enhanced voting rights 
associated with the share. 
II. Conclusion 
From an economic point of view, the United States and Europe represent two of the 
biggest players in the global financial markets.  As such, the policies they promulgate in 
relation to corporate governance, and dual class shares specifically, are of significant 
influence.  Derived from different influences in their domestic capital markets, dual class 
shares have developed along different trajectories in Germany and the United States.  As 
such, the permissible dual class structures in each country are different, and the cadre of 
enforcement mechanisms available within each jurisdiction is unique, with the U.S. regime 
relying more heavily on private enforcement mechanisms and hard law than the German 
regulatory framework, which derives its effectiveness through soft law.  In both countries, 
limitations on the transferability of enhanced voting shares serve as an additional mechanism 
to protect against hostile takeover, though in practice the German usage of registered shares 
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has been streamlined to better facilitate transfers, while American “sunset provisions” remain 
powerful transfer deterrents.  As the capital markets become increasingly globalized, it is 
highly likely that these regimes will come to more closely resemble one another.  As 
globalized institutional investors gain deeper footholds in the markets, they are also likely to 
demand greater continuity among the exchanges and their related enforcement regimes. 
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